This paper provides an introduction to telecommunications policy in Canada, outlining the regulatory and legislative environment governing the provision of telecommunications services in the country and describing basic characteristics of its retail telecommunications services market. It was written in 2017 as one in a series of papers describing international telecommunications policies and markets published in the Australian Journal of Telecommunications and the Digital Economy in 2016 and 2017. Drawing primarily from regulatory and policy documents, the discussion focuses on broad trends, central policy objectives and major players involved in building and operating Canada's telecommunications infrastructure. The paper is descriptive rather than evaluative, and does not offer an exhaustive discussion of all telecommunications policy issues, markets and providers in Canada.
Introduction
In 2017, Canada's population was estimated to be above 36.5 million people (Statistics Canada, 2017) . Although Canada has a large land mass and low population density, more than 80% of Canadians i live in urban areas, the majority in close proximity to the border operate PCS networks (Industry Canada, 2010) .
In the late 1990s Canada's telephone and cable companies were among the first in the world to roll out DSL and cable broadband Internet services (Lie, 2003) , establishing the practice of facilities-based competition that continues to this day. The CRTC also requires facilitiesbased operators to provide wholesale access to their networks to allow market entrants to offer competitive services, and increase provider choice for Canadians (CRTC, 2008b (CRTC, , 2010a .
The evolution of Canada's telecommunications markets and regulatory environment was examined in a 2005-2006 review of telecommunication policy. The review panel recommended "significant changes" and offered a number of detailed recommendations to ensure that all Canadians would have access to affordable telecommunications services, to enhance the efficiency of telecommunications markets and to enhance social well-being and inclusiveness. The panel recommended the separation of policy making and regulation, calling for Industry Canada (now ISED) to transfer its regulatory responsibilities (e.g. spectrum regulation) to the CRTC, but this has not happened. The panel also recommended strengthening the policy making capacity of Industry Canada, and encouraged the government to be more proactive in setting policy by means of Governor in Council orders (Telecommunications Policy Review Panel, 2006) . In response to the panel's recommendations, in 2006 the federal government issued a policy directive requiring the CRTC to rely on market forces "to the maximum extent feasible" when developing telecommunications policy. In instances where regulation is deemed to be necessary it must be "efficient and proportionate" (Privy Council, 2006) . The CRTC developed several action plans to review its regulatory measures following this directive (CRTC, 2007b (CRTC, , 2008c (CRTC, , 2010b .
While the guiding principle for achieving Canada's telecommunications policy objectives is to encourage competitors to provide the affordable, high quality communications services Canadians need, the CRTC does intervene when it determines that market forces alone are insufficient to achieve policy objectives. In recent years, regulation has addressed issues like defining basic telecommunications services (CRTC, 2016e), developing competitive wholesale markets for the provision of fixed and mobile telecommunications services (CRTC,
Telecommunications service providers in Canada
Fixed line services In Canada, fixed line telecommunications infrastructure for telephone and Internet services is owned by different providers in different parts of the country. Each geographic market is served by a monopoly telephone network operator (telco) and a monopoly cable network operator (cableco), with no single telco or cableco offering service across the entire country.
While these technology-centric descriptors are becoming obsolete as both cablecos and telcos upgrade their legacy networks to extend the reach of fibre-optical infrastructure, they do help to explain the evolution of the market. Telcos operated copper telephone networks and continue to deliver services using this infrastructure. Cablecos operated cable television networks and were the primary distributors of television services. They entered the telecommunications market in the 1990s, ix offering broadband Internet services over their hybrid-fibre coaxial (HFC) cable infrastructure. Cablecos also offer telephone services in competition with the telcos. x Telcos now compete with cablecos to provide television service, with telcos delivering television via Internet protocol (IPTV) or satellite. Additional competition in provision of television services comes from online content providers (CRTC, 2017b) . In regulatory documents, the CRTC calls former telco monopolies "incumbent providers" and former cable monopolies "cable-based carriers" (CRTC, 2017a, Appendix 8) and this terminology is used here.
In 2017 the incumbent provider in the provinces of British Columbia and Alberta (western Canada) is TELUS. In Saskatchewan, the incumbent provider is SaskTel, which is the sole Crown corporation (i.e. government-owned company) remaining among Canada's large incumbent providers. xi Manitoba's incumbent provider, Manitoba Telecom Services (MTS), was acquired by Bell in 2017 and now operates as Bell MTS (BCE, 2017) . Bell is the incumbent in Ontario. Bell and its subsidiary Télébec are the incumbent providers in Québec (with Télébec offering services to smaller communities). Bell is also the incumbent in Atlantic Canada, where it operates as Bell Aliant. Bell subsidiary Northwestel is the incumbent in Canada's North. There are a few small incumbent providers serving small territories are not as neatly divided as those of the incumbent providers (e.g. Eastlink and Shaw serve some communities in Ontario, and Cogeco offers service in parts of Québec) but cable-based carriers do not compete with each other.
Most Canadian households can choose to purchase their fixed line telecommunications services from an incumbent provider or a cable-based carrier (CRTC, 2017a, p. 278) . These companies compete directly with each other within their operating territories (e.g. Bell competes with Rogers in Ontario; TELUS competes with Shaw in Alberta). The incumbent providers and cable-based carriers collectively dominate the market, with the largest five incumbent providers earning 59% of retail telecommunications revenues in 2016, and the five largest cable-based carriers earning a further 35% (CRTC, 2017a, p. 222). xii While some consumers buy services from both the incumbent provider and the cable-based carrier (e.g. demonstrating a preference for the reliability of a copper telephone line, but wanting the speed of cable Internet), the majority of Canadians choose to purchase their telecom services in bundles from a single provider (getting at least two of landline, internet and television services from either the cableco or the telco, CRTC, 2017a, p. 45).
With mandated wholesale network access (CRTC, 2015f) providers who do not own their own facilities are able to offer retail services over existing copper, cable and fibre networks.
In 2016 almost 50% of wholesale broadband Internet connections used cable-based carriers' networks (CRTC, 2017a, p. 345), reflecting a different market dynamic than in most other countries where wholesale access to cable networks is not mandated (Hou, Valcke, & Stevens, 2013) .
While some rural households have access to fibre to the home (typically provided by small local providers), xiii about a third of rural households in Canada have no access to any type of fixed line broadband Internet service and are served by fixed wireless providers (CRTC, 2017a, p. 281). Some fixed wireless providers hold licences to deliver services over unused television broadcasting spectrum, operating what are known as Remote Rural Broadband Systems (RRBS). Although RRBS operators offer high quality affordable service, they cannot operate within 121 kilometres of the US border or close to major urban centres (thereby excluding much of the Canadian population from their potential customer base). There is a moratorium on new RRBS licences while decisions are pending as to the repurposing of the 600 MHz spectrum band (Industry , and the number of operators and customers is in decline (Taylor, 2017) .
A company called Xplornet offers Internet and telephone services by fixed wireless and direct-to-home satellite and advertises that it can provide service "everywhere in Canada" (Xplornet, 2017) . Satellite services are also available through a community aggregator model, Communications Inc., 2017). As a result, many Canadian households will eventually have access to two gigabit networks, and will have additional choice in service providers once wholesale access to these networks is available. The CRTC mandated wholesale access to fibre networks in 2015, using a phased implementation approach (CRTC, 2015f Canada, 2017a; Matawa First Nations, 2017) or the CRTC's broadband funding regime (CRTC, 2016b, described below). Gigabit connectivity will also be enabled by projects like the SWIFT network (http://swiftnetwork.ca), which is extending a fibre backbone network into Southwestern Ontario, through a partnership funded by the federal, provincial and municipal levels of government.
Wireless services
The market for wireless services (mobile voice, SMS and data products, i.e. mobile Internet) governments, and observes that "The widespread availability and adoption of broadband Internet access services are issues that cannot be solved by the Commission alone." At the time of writing a consultation was underway to determine how this fund will operate (CRTC, 2017d) . While the decision addressed funding to extend broadband networks, it does not offer any direct mechanisms to address the affordability of retail telecommunications services.
The policy establishing the new universal service obligation directs mobile network operators to offer service packages that meet the needs of Canadians with disabilities and to publicise these packages on their websites. Canada's major telecommunications service providers must also file a report with the Commission outlining their plans to invest in improving the accessibility of telecommunications services. Additionally, providers offering fixed broadband Internet access must ensure that their service contracts are written in plain language, offer information on how much data is used by common online activities and provide tools for data consumption monitoring. These actions are designed to ensure inclusive access to communication systems, and align with similar requirements for mobile broadband Internet providers established in the Wireless Code.
The state of competition in Canada's telecommunications markets
In various decisions, the CRTC has ruled that retail markets for telecommunications services in Canada are competitive, and it forbears from regulating them. There are however concerns, expressed by government ministers (Bains, 2017a; Joly & Bains, 2017) , the head of Canada's Competition Bureau (Pecman, 2017) , citizens and public interest advocacy groups (see for example the records of the CRTC consultations on Basic telecommunications services xvi and the Review of the Wireless Code of Conduct xvii ), and a former CRTC chair (Blais, 2017) , that Canadian consumers have not seen the full benefits expected to result from competition, for instance the development of innovative products and lowering of prices.
In the fixed line Internet market, incumbent providers (the operators of the copper telephone network) told the CRTC that they would reduce or delay investment in fibre networks if they were required to provide wholesale access to these networks (see the record of the 2013-2014 Review of wholesale services xviii and Bell's petition to the Governor in Council (Bell Canada, 2015) requesting that the CRTC's decision to impose access requirements be overturned). The decision to mandate access was not overturned (Bains, 2016) and incumbents are now increasing investment in fibre to the home connectivity.
Protecting and Advocating for Consumers Network Neutrality
Canada's Telecommunications Act states that no Canadian carrier shall "unjustly discriminate or give an undue or unreasonable preference toward any person, including itself, or subject any person to an undue or unreasonable disadvantage" when it is providing a telecommunications service (Canada, 1993, 27 (2) ). The CRTC has established network neutrality rules to interpret this provision of the Act and to counter vertical and diagonal integration in the Canada telecommunications market.
The Internet traffic management practices (ITMP) framework (CRTC, 2009) requires
Internet service providers to be transparent when applying any traffic management practices. It encourages investment in network capacity as the primary remedy for network congestion issues and favours the use of economic practices (e.g. consumption-based pricing) rather than technical ones (e.g. managing congestion by slowing down certain types of traffic -peer-to-peer file transfers being one example). Where traffic management practices are applied they must address a defined need and be carefully designed to avoid incurring unjust discrimination.
The 2015 mobile television decision (CRTC, 2015a; upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal, 2016) determined that mobile network operators could not exempt their mobile television offerings from data charges. Following additional complaints about differential pricing practices (e.g. "zero-rating" traffic by not counting it against a consumer's data cap, or discounting certain types of data), the Commission determined that these practices generally have a negative impact on competition and their continued application would not benefit consumers (CRTC, 2017g). The evaluation framework for differential pricing practices (on a complaints-based, ex post basis) will rely primarily upon whether data is treated agnostically (noting that zero-rating is "likely" to raise concerns whereas pricing based on time-of-day is not), but will also consider whether an offering is exclusive, whether there is financial compensation involved and whether a practice creates barriers to entry for content providers or reduces innovation. The framework does not apply to services offered on Internet service providers' (ISPs) managed Internet protocol networks (e.g. Internet of Things products used by businesses).
In the CRTC's view, the best approach to achieve Canada's telecommunication policy objectives and to ensure competition in the provision of retail Internet services is for "ISPs
[to] compete and differentiate their services based on their networks and the attributes of the services on those networks, such as price, speed, volume, coverage, and the quality of their (1995, 1997a) for discussion of changes to the policy environment intended to facilitate competition between facilities-based providers.
x For instance, Rogers was the first cable company in North America to offer a broadband service, launching service in 1995 (Rogers, 2016) . It launched a telephone service in 2005.
xi In 2017, the Saskatchewan government passed a bill allowing it to sell up to 49% of its Crown corporations, and has considered the impact of selling a portion of SaskTel (CBC News, 2017).
xii Note that these figures include revenues from wireless services, which now make up more than 50% of retail revenues.
xiii For instance there are several such providers in Southwestern Ontario, including Quadro Communications Co-op and Hay Communications.
xiv Regarding terminology describing Canada's wireless industry, the CRTC generally refers to the "mobile wireless" market. Mobile network operators are referred to as Wireless Service Providers or
WSPs and are also known in the industry as wireless carriers.
xv Telecommunications service providers generating more than $10 million in annual revenues contribute a small portion of their revenues to the National Contribution Fund, which subsidises the provision of telephone service in high-cost serving areas (CRTC, 2007a 
